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On 11 June 2004, a referendum in Ireland​[1]​ resulted in a large majority in favour of restricting the entitlement of all those born on the island of Ireland to citizenship (here referred to as ‘birthright citizenship’ or ‘unconditional ius soli’). This was the latest development in a controversy over birthright citizenship in Irish nationality law. The Irish authorities had already succeeded in 2003 in establishing the legal principle that the parents of Irish citizen children did not necessarily have a right of residence in Ireland. After the referendum, the Government’s intention is to change the legislation on nationality, so as to require prior residence by parents who are neither Irish nor British if their children are to acquire citizenship. If done, this will be the first time in the history of the Irish state that such a restriction will have been legislated for. 







A short history of birthright citizenship in Irish law 

The historical starting-point of Irish nationality law was Article 3 of the Free State Constitution of 1922. That Article sought to define the original citizens of the Free State from among the persons alive when the state came into being on 6 December 1922. Under Article 3, the essential requirement for citizenship was that a person was domiciled “in the area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State” on 6 December 1922. It was also necessary to satisfy a further condition: that the person, or one of their parents, had been born in “Ireland”, or alternatively that the person had been “ordinarily resident” for seven years in the “area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State” on 6 December 1922. Birth on the island of Ireland therefore led to citizenship under Article 3, but only if the person in question satisfied the requirement of domicile on 6 December 1922. 

Article 3 of the Irish Free State Constitution provided that “the future acquisition and termination of citizenship” was to be determined by law. There was an initial delay in legislating on the subject due to a dispute with Britain as to the international status of Irish Free State citizenship (see below). A code of nationality law was eventually defined by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935. It was here that unconditional ius soli was introduced into Irish nationality law. Under the 1935 Act, all those born in the Irish Free State on or after 6 December 1922 were classed as ‘natural-born citizens’.​[2]​ The 1935 Act also provided that those born on the island of Ireland before 6 December 1922, and who had not become citizens under Article 3 of the 1922 Constitution, could obtain citizenship in two ways: if they were permanently resident in the state on or after the coming into force of the 1935 Act; or, for those who were not naturalised in another state, upon registration.​[3]​ The 1935 Act did not however make any provision that those born in Northern Ireland after 6 December 1922 would qualify as Irish citizens through birth. 

In 1937, a new Constitution was adopted, which renamed the state ‘Ireland’. Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution included the claim that Northern Ireland was within the ‘national territory’, while Article 3 stated that “pending the re-integration of the national territory”, the laws adopted by the Irish Parliament would have the same “area and extent of application” as those of the Irish Free State. As regards citizenship, Article 9 provided that those who were citizens of the Irish Free State on the coming into force of the Constitution became citizens of Ireland automatically. In other respects, the acquisition and loss of citizenship was to be governed by legislation. 

The terms of Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution were then reflected in the reform of nationality law by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956. The 1956 Act followed Article 2 in extending the principle of unconditional ius soli to Northern Ireland.​[4]​ The 1956 Act was also fully retrospective, so that all births on the island of Ireland prior to the 1956 Act could give rise to Irish citizenship without the satisfaction of any further substantive condition. The only qualification in the 1956 Act echoed Article 3: it was stated that, “pending the re-integration of the national territory”, those born in Northern Ireland after 6 December 1922, and who did not acquire Irish citizenship in another way, were required to make a formal declaration of citizenship.​[5]​ 

The extension of unconditional ius soli to Northern Ireland in 1956 was not however of great significance in practice. This was because most persons born in Northern Ireland were anyway Irish citizens by descent. In the eyes of Irish law, the “area of jurisdiction” of the Irish Free State on 6 December 1922 was the whole island of Ireland, since, formally, Northern Ireland opted-out of the new state only the following day.​[6]​ Irish law therefore treated the vast majority of persons domiciled in Northern Ireland on 6 December 1922 as having become Irish citizens under Article 3. The 1935 Act had provided for the acquisition of citizenship by descent only through fathers, and had conferred citizenship automatically only on the first generation of children born outside the state after 6 December 1922. But the 1956 Act went much further: it provided that citizenship passed through either parent, and, more importantly, that citizenship would cease to pass automatically only from the second generation born outside the island of Ireland. Since the 1956 Act also applied retrospectively, the result was that any person descended from someone born on the island of Ireland before 6 December 1922 was automatically an Irish citizen, so long as not more than one successive generation had been born outside the island of Ireland.​[7]​ As the Irish Minister for Justice put it at the time: 

“the vast majority of those in the Six Counties who, of course, are of Irish stock will have Irish nationality and citizenship when this Bill is enacted into law…. [B]ut there will remain a limited category born in the Six Counties since 1922 who are of entirely alien parentage without racial ties, and for these … we provide that on making a voluntary declaration their Irish citizenship operates from the date of their birth …”​[8]​
 
The extension of unconditional ius soli to Northern Ireland in 1956 was therefore of practical relevance above all to persons who did not have a historical family connection to the island of Ireland.

The emergence of a principle of unconditional ius soli in Irish law in 1935 and 1956 can be attributed to two influences. In the first place, the recognition of ius soli in Irish law was undoubtedly of British inspiration. It is well known that the historical preference for unconditional ius soli in British nationality law has its origins in the feudal theory that those born in a territory were the sovereign’s subjects. Many states which emerged from British colonies based their nationality law on unconditional ius soli, and this remains true in Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the USA.​[9]​ Britain retained unconditional ius soli until the British Nationality Act 1981, which provided that citizenship would be acquired by birth only if a parent was either a British citizen or permanently resident in Britain.​[10]​ Unconditional ius soli was also the position in Australia, until a reform in 1986 required that a parent be an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or have been resident for ten years at the time of the birth.​[11]​ Even today, all of these states differ from the historical approach among continental European states, where citizenship is typically acquired through descent or naturalisation, and there is either limited provision or none at all for the automatic acquisition of citizenship through birth to non-nationals on the territory.

There is moreover specific evidence for the influence of the British approach to nationality law in drafting of the 1935 Act. At that time, the Irish Free State remained a British dominion.​[12]​ British policy in the 1920s and 1930s was to minimise the differences between the nationality laws of its dominions, so as to maintain a common status of British subject for the whole Commonwealth. The Irish Free State authorities’ general view was that Irish citizenship was autonomous from British subject status.​[13]​ Nevertheless, they were willing to seek consistency between different dominions’ laws, in order to ensure advantages for Irish citizens elsewhere in the Commonwealth, and presumably so as to avoid conflict with Britain. The proposals from which the 1935 Act derived therefore proposed that the conditions for acquiring the status of ‘natural-born citizen’ of the Irish state should correspond to those in the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.​[14]​ Under section 1 of that Act, “all persons born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance” were ‘natural-born British subjects’. 









The question of citizenship by birth in Ireland first acquired prominence in recent years as a result of the Belfast Agreement of April 1998.​[15]​ This was an attempt at a political settlement for Northern Ireland, and was agreed between the British and Irish governments and all but one of Northern Ireland’s major political parties. One new development in the Agreement was the acceptance by Unionist parties that persons born in Northern Ireland should be entitled to opt for Irish citizenship. The Agreement therefore recognised “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves, and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose ….”​[16]​ That statement was then the subject of a declaration by the two governments, in which they expressed their “joint understanding” that the term “the people of Northern Ireland” meant “all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time, of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence.”​[17]​

The Belfast Agreement also provided for the amendment of Article 2 of the Irish Constitution. The new Article 2, as set out in the Agreement, was to replace the territorial claim with a second ‘birthright’ clause: 

“It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.”​[18]​ 

That amendment to the Irish Constitution was approved by a 94% majority in a referendum in May 1998, and took effect on 2 December 1999.

A close examination of the new Article 2 reveals its relevance to nationality law. It logically implies that persons born anywhere on the island of Ireland are entitled not merely to membership of the ‘Irish nation’ in the abstract, but also to the legal status of Irish citizen. This is the result of the reference in Article 2 to “persons born in the island of Ireland .. to be part of the Irish nation” in the first sentence, and to “persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland” (emphasis added) in the second. The then Minister for Justice, John O’Donoghue endorsed that interpretation in January 2000, when he indicated that “in a nutshell, there was a statutory entitlement and now there will be a constitutional entitlement.”​[19]​ This interpretation was also accepted by Hardiman J in the Supreme Court in Lobe in January 2003. As he put it, “the phrase ‘otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland’ … is not easy to understand without an implication that the condition of ‘being part of the Irish Nation’ entitles one to citizenship.”​[20]​

The amendment of Article 2 was followed by the reform of nationality law by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001.​[21]​ The 2001 Act did away with the previous formal distinction between birth in the Irish state and in Northern Ireland. After the 2001 Act, those born in either part of the island of Ireland, and entitled to Irish citizenship alone, acquire it automatically. By contrast, those who are also entitled to another nationality acquire Irish citizenship only if they perform an “act which only an Irish citizen is entitled to do”, such as a formal declaration of citizenship, an application for a passport, or registration to vote in presidential election.​[22]​ This latter category includes most persons seeking citizenship through birth in Northern Ireland, as well as persons born in the Irish state who are entitled to another citizenship through a non-Irish parent. Where such an act is done, the individual is deemed to have been an Irish citizen from birth.​[23]​ The 2001 Act also removed the previous restrictions on acquisition of citizenship through birth in Ireland, for the children of accredited diplomats, and for children born in Irish territory to non-nationals on board a foreign registered ship or aircraft.​[24]​ 

	The 2001 Act did not however significantly alter the law on the acquisition of citizenship by descent.​[25]​ In particular, it continues to be the case that the requirement to register applies only from the second generation born outside the island of Ireland. For those born on the island of Ireland to Irish citizen parents, or the first generation born outside the island, citizenship by descent is automatic. The 2001 Act also retained the rule that the failure of a parent to exercise their own Irish citizenship by birth prior to a child’s birth does not “of itself” prevent the acquisition of Irish citizenship by the child. That was also the position under the original 1956 Act for the children of persons who acquired citizenship through descent from a person who registered their birth in Northern Ireland.​[26]​ 


The parents of Irish citizen children

The recognition of unconditional ius soli in Irish law, first as a statutory rule, and then as a constitutional one, had implications for Irish immigration law. It created the possibility that families of Irish citizen children would make a legal claim to remain in the state on the basis of their connection to an Irish citizen. That line of argument is a potentially strong one in the Irish context, because of Article 41 of the Constitution: it recognises “the family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.” 

In the mid-1980s, Article 41 began to be invoked by the spouses and parents of Irish citizens in order to resist deportation. The first reported High Court decision in which the argument was addressed was Pok Sun Shun in 1985.​[27]​ That concerned a Chinese national with a wife and three children who were Irish citizens. In that case, Costello J rejected the view that marriage to an Irish citizen created an absolute right to remain in state, and tended to the view that marriage made no difference whatever to the Minister for Justice’s power to deport a non-national. That was followed in 1986 by the decision in Osheku, concerning a Nigerian national whose wife and child were Irish citizens. There too, Gannon J essentially treated the fact of marriage to an Irish citizen as irrelevant: the applicant could not “by a marriage with the State … acquire status of citizenship nor immunity from the sanctions of the law in respect of his continued disobedience of the law.”​[28]​ 

These decisions were then followed in the High Court in 1987 in the key case of Fajujonu.​[29]​ That concerned a Nigerian and Moroccan married couple who had taken up residence in Ireland in 1981 in breach of immigration law. They had a child in Ireland in 1983, and two further children in Ireland after 1984. In 1984, the Department of Justice indicated that it would not permit them to reside in Ireland, though without making a formal deportation order. The family applied for a judicial determination to the effect that they had a right to reside in the state. In the High Court, Barrington J accepted that the daughter had constitutional rights both to reside in Ireland and to the society of her parents. But he went on to conclude that 

“it does not follow … that she has a right to the society of her parents in Ireland. I do not think that the parents can by positing on their child a wish to remain in Ireland in their society confer upon themselves a right to remain in Ireland…”​[30]​ 

He therefore refused the orders against the Minister which had been sought.

The Supreme Court took a quite different approach on appeal in Fajujonu. Two judgments were delivered, by Finlay CJ and Walsh J, and were endorsed by the three remaining judges. Each of the judgments first held that the Fajujonu children had a right to family life which was exercisable in Ireland. Finlay CJ put it as follows: 

“where, as occurs in this case, an alien has in fact resided for an appreciable time in the State and has become a member of a family unit within the State containing children who are citizens … there can be no question but that those children, as citizens, have got a constitutional right to the company, care and parentage of their parents within a family unit … [P]rima facie and subject to the exigencies of the common good … that is a right which these citizens [are] entitled to exercise within the State.”​[31]​ 

Walsh J expressed a similar understanding of the legal position:

“the first two-named plaintiffs [the parents] and their three children constitute a family within the meaning of the Constitution and the three children are entitled to the care, protection and society of their parents in this family group which is resident in the State. There is no doubt that the family has made its home and residence in Ireland.” ​[32]​

It followed that the children’s right to family life in Ireland had to be given significant weight in decisions taken with respect to their parents. For Finlay CJ, the Minister could deny the parents a right of residence only if satisfied that “a grave and substantial reason associated with the common good” required such a step.​[33]​ Similarly, Walsh J concluded that the Minister

“would have to be satisfied that the interests of the common good of the people of Ireland and of the protection of the State are so predominant and so overwhelming in the circumstances of the case that an action which can have the effect of breaking up this family is not so disproportionate to the aim sought to be achieved as to be unsustainable.”​[34]​ 






It is well known that, from the second half of the 1990s, Ireland became for the first time in its modern history a state of significant immigration. Census data shows that the percentage of the usually resident population born outside Ireland and Britain rose from 1.6% in 1996 to 4.0% in 2002.​[35]​ There was also a marked increase in the number of work permits issued to non-EU nationals, up from roughly 1,100 in 1993, to roughly 18,000 in 2000, and more than 47,500 in 2003.​[36]​ Applications for asylum also grew rapidly: where there had only been 39 applications in 1992 and 91 in 1993, there was a peak of 11,634 applications in 2002, before a fall in 2003 to 7,900 applications.​[37]​ In 2002, Ireland was the EU member state with the third highest per capita rate of applications.​[38]​ 

For several years after 1989, the decision in Fajujonu had been the basis for acceptance by the Department of Justice of residence in Ireland by the non-national parents of Irish citizen children. While the publicly-available statistics are incomplete, it is clear that, as immigration to Ireland increased in general, so too did applications to remain in Ireland on the basis of parenthood.​[39]​ In 1996 and 1997, permission to remain as a parent was granted to 142 and 107 current or former asylum applicants, respectively. After a pause due to a review of the policy in 1998, permission was granted to 1227 current or former asylum applicants and 201 others in 1999 (a total of 1428), and to 909 current or former asylum applicants, and 606 others in 2000 (a total of 1515). Further increases then saw 6570 applications in 2001 (5924 in respect of current or former asylum applicants) and 8620 applications in 2002.​[40]​ It was this increase which led the Department of Justice to change its policy towards the end of 2001, and to begin refusing applications from parents of Irish citizen children, where the family had not been in Ireland for an “appreciable time”.​[41]​

The test case of Lobe emerged out of the new policy. The proceedings concerned a Czech Roma family (the Lobes) and a Nigerian family (the Osayandes), whose circumstances were similar in their essential facts.​[42]​ One or both parents had applied for asylum in Ireland, having previously been refused asylum in Britain, and were to be returned to Britain under the Dublin Convention. An initial deportation order had been made prior to the birth of the Irish citizen child. After the birth of the child, the deportation was reconsidered, and the same three reasons were given for proceeding with it. These were: the short period the family had been in the state (then nine months and seven months, respectively), the application of the Dublin Convention, and “the overriding need to preserve respect for and the integrity of the asylum and immigration systems.”​[43]​ 

The applications to set aside the deportation decisions were rejected in the High Court in April 2002,​[44]​ and again on appeal by a five-to-two majority in the Supreme Court in January 2003. Within the Supreme Court majority, Keane CJ, Hardiman J and Denham J delivered judgments along similar lines, and Geoghegan J concurred with the first two of those. A fifth judge, Murray J, agreed with the result, but offered a legal analysis which differed in important respects from the rest of the majority. Within the minority, Fennelly J delivered a fully-argued judgment, with which McGuinness J agreed, while adding substantial comments on her own.​[45]​

For the four-judge majority, the starting-point was that the Irish citizenship of children did not confer legal protection against the deportation of their parents. Keane CJ and Hardiman J took the view that the Irish citizen child was incapable of making a choice as to residence, so that the child’s right of residence in Ireland was ineffective, and there was no basis for the claimed entitlement of the parents to remain.​[46]​ Denham J meanwhile allowed that the child had an effective right of residence in Ireland, but concluded that, in exercising a choice on the child’s behalf, the parents were obliged to respect their own lack of a right of residence.​[47]​ The four-judge majority overcame the possible precedent of Fajujonu by arguing that it turned on its particular facts.​[48]​ The position of the Lobes and Osayandes was to be distinguished, because of their lack of a significant period of residence in Ireland. It followed that these applications were to be treated as conventional claims for judicial review of an administrative decision. They were to be decided according to the usual, deferential, standard, which is “whether the decisions were so manifestly contrary to reason and common sense that they must be set aside.”​[49]​ 

The fifth judge in the majority, Murray J, offered a different analysis of the legal position, which more closely followed the reasoning and language in Fajujonu. He was prepared to accept that the children’s constitutional rights were in play: “the children have a general right of residence in the State and prima facie a right to the company and parentage of their parents within the family unit while within the State.”​[50]​ He also insisted that these rights had to be given specific weight in the Minister’s decision-making: “the Minister must take into account … the prima facie constitutional rights deriving from the citizenship of the infants in question, and consider whether, notwithstanding those rights, there are good and sufficient reasons for the deportation of the parents.”​[51]​ When it came to the final decision, however, he nevertheless found that that test had been met by the Minister.

All five judges in the majority were in agreement as to the reasons which the Minister could legitimately rely upon in support of a decision to deport. They firstly agreed that the Minister was entitled to base his decision on the general need to preserve the integrity of the immigration and asylum systems.​[52]​ This involved the rejection of the applicants’ proposition that – at least in a case involving a family with an Irish citizen member - specific reasons had to be advanced, such as the criminal conduct of the individual being deported. All five judges in the majority also accepted that the Minister was entitled to have regard to the Dublin Convention in deciding to deport.​[53]​ This may be thought surprising, given that the Dublin Convention does not require a state to transfer an applicant, and specifically provides for a state to choose to determine an asylum claim notwithstanding the Convention’s provisions. Having accepted the validity of those reasons, all of the majority, including Murray J, went on to uphold the decisions to deport in the two proceedings.

By contrast with the majority, the minority judgments gave far greater weight to the constitutional rights in play. In the first place, the new Article 2 of the Constitution was taken to have altered the quality of Irish citizenship. As Fennelly J put it, “The ‘birthright of every person born in Ireland …to be part of the Irish nation’ must have real content and should not be treated as a piece of empty sloganeering.”​[54]​ In particular, it entailed the possibility of growing up in Ireland, and therefore a right of residence for the child and their parents: “a child who is de facto deported from the State before his education commences cannot conceivably be ‘part of the Irish nation’ or ‘share its cultural identity and heritage’.”​[55]​ Secondly, the strong protection given to the family by Article 41 of the Constitution had to be respected. For Fennelly J, under Article 41 “the rights of the family are superior to those of the State itself.”​[56]​ For McGuinness J, “compelling reasons [were] required to displace” the rights of the family.​[57]​ 

	The minority also disagreed with the four-judge group’s assessment that Fajujonu could be distinguished. Once the relevance of the constitutional rights of the Irish citizen was accepted, it was hard to see how those rights could depend upon the length of time the family had been in the State. The general principle in Fajujonu therefore remained relevant: there had to be a substantial reason justifying the deportation of the parents.​[58]​ The minority also rejected the five-judge majority’s assessment of the permissible reasons for a deportation decision. It was not enough to rely upon a general concern to maintain the integrity of the immigration and asylum systems, given that the rights of Irish citizens were at issue.​[59]​ Reliance upon the Dublin Convention was also rejected, given that the State was not required to send the applicants back.​[60]​ 

	In legal terms, the majority and minority therefore disagreed as to the relative weight to be attached to executive power and to constitutional rights, at least in a case where an Irish citizen is involved. It is clear however that the judges in the majority were significantly influenced by their concern to ensure the orderly regulation of immigration to Ireland. In the first place, the majority relied upon the changed circumstances with respect to immigration and asylum in order to distinguish Fajujonu. As Hardiman J put it, “it would be unreal not to have due regard to the manifest truth that factual conditions in Ireland, in terms of immigration and otherwise, are very different to those that prevailed in 1989 …”​[61]​ Secondly, the changed circumstances featured in the majority’s reasons for allowing the Minister to base his deportation decisions on the need to respect the integrity of the systems of immigration control. As Murray J put it, with reference to applications for asylum:

“there is manifestly a distinction to be drawn between a situation where the number of persons seeking to enter the State is any one year is very low, for example 30 or 40, and the situation where many thousands seek to do so. In the latter situation, the … necessity of maintaining the integrity of such a system in the interests of the common good is far greater than in the former case.”​[62]​ 

Finally, the notion of a fundamental change in circumstances appeared simply as a general background consideration. To quote Keane CJ: 

“It cannot be right that this court should approach this case on the assumption, totally at variance with the facts known to us, that conditions in Ireland are as they were in the 1980s when there was a relatively high level of unemployment, many Irish people were emigrating to seek work abroad and there were relatively few immigrants or persons seeking asylum as refugees.… [T]he legislature and executive cannot be expected to disregard the problems which an increased volume of immigration invariably creates, because of the strains it places on the infrastructure of social services, and, human nature being what it is, the difficulty of integrating people from very different ethnic and cultural backgrounds into the fabric of Irish society.”​[63]​ 

It was because of that background that the majority were concerned that the legal regime should not be such that the birth of an Irish child (the so-called ‘anchor child’) would enable non-nationals to circumvent the immigration and asylum systems. As Keane CJ put it, 

“The executive is … entitled to take the view that the orderly system in place for dealing with immigration and asylum applications should not be undermined by persons seeking to take advantage of the period of time which necessarily elapses between their arrival in the State and the complete processing of their applications for asylum by relying on the birth of a child to one of them during that period as a reason for permitting them to reside in the State indefinitely.”​[64]​ 






The Irish authorities responded to the Lobe ruling by ceasing to accept new applications for residence which were based on parental status.​[66]​ In July 2003, they then announced that in future parenthood of an Irish citizen child would only be taken into account as part of representations against a deportation.​[67]​ In practice, however, there have been very few deportations of the parents of Irish citizen children since the Lobe ruling. In January 2004, it was reported that, out of approximately 11,000 families whose applications had been outstanding at the time of the ruling, only 358 had received a notice of intention to deport, and only three families had actually been deported.​[68]​ While other families had presumably left the state, it is likely that several thousand remained without a determination of their status. 

The lack of deportations may be due in part to the legal issues left unresolved by the decision in Lobe. Chief among these was the position in Irish law of families whose cases were stronger than the applicants there. It is unclear from the judgments of the four-judge majority when, if at all, a higher degree of scrutiny than in conventional judicial review is required. Does it still matter that applicant parents have been present in Ireland for an ‘appreciable time’, and if so what is meant by ‘appreciable’? It is also unclear from the judgments of the whole majority when immigration control considerations are persuasive. In particular, what if a parent has come to Ireland legally, so that respect for the immigration and asylum system is less compelling, and the Dublin Convention irrelevant? These are not questions on which Lobe can be said to have given definite guidance. 

	The potential application of Article 8 ECHR to deportation cases is another area of uncertainty. At the time of Lobe, the ECHR was not part of Irish law, and it was accepted that it could not be relied upon. Two judges in the majority nevertheless offered the view that the proposed deportations were compatible with Article 8 ECHR.​[69]​ By contrast, Fennelly J concluded that Article 8 ECHR might be engaged and that, if it was, a state would not be able to justify a deportation by reference to general statements concerning the system of immigration control.​[70]​ It is significant that the ECHR has now been incorporated into Irish law, and is binding on “every organ of the State”.​[71]​ This will permit reliance on recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights which have found breaches of Article 8 ECHR in deportation cases because family life is “practically impossible” in another state due to the impossibility of a spouse’s integrating there.​[72]​ A child’s difficulty of moving country might equally protect a parent otherwise liable to deportation. This could in particular be the case where a child has spent a considerable time in Ireland, or there are specific reasons why the child cannot be expected to move to the state of parental nationality. 

	The potential contribution of EU law cannot be ruled out either. At the time of writing, the question of the rights of Irish citizen children and their families to reside in other EU member states is before the Court of Justice in Chen.​[73]​ That case concerns a child who acquired Irish citizenship through birth in Belfast to a Chinese national mother who was not resident in Britain. In his opinion delivered in May 2004, Advocate General Tizzano concluded that, as an EU citizen, the child was entitled to reside in Britain under Council Directive 90/364. He also found that, in order for the child’s right of personal movement to have real effect, the child’s mother had to have a derivative right to reside in Britain. Even if endorsed by the Court of Justice, the principle set out in the Chen opinion will admittedly be of limited scope. A family will have to have sufficient resources to maintain the child and parent(s) in another member state, so as to meet the requirements of Directive 90/364. It may also turn out that a variation on the ruling in Akrich will apply, so that only family members lawfully resident in some member state can benefit from the rights of personal movement of EU citizens.​[74]​ 







The Irish Government was already considering the possibility of a constitutional referendum to remove unconditional ius soli in 2001.​[76]​ As we have seen, it chose instead at that time to operate the new policy which was confirmed in Lobe. The possibility of a constitutional amendment remained a live one, however. In its June 2002 programme, the re-elected Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition indicated that it would “keep under review the number of applications from non-nationals to remain in the State on the basis of parentage of an Irish-born child,” and that it would “initiate all-party discussions on the issue of such constitutional or other measures which might be required.”​[77]​ It appears that one of the possibilities under consideration in mid-2002 was a clause in the Constitution to the effect that citizens could not confer a right of residence on their parents.​[78]​ 

After the Supreme Court judgment in Lobe, the necessity of a constitutional referendum appeared to have been removed. It therefore came as something of surprise when in March 2004 the Government announced a proposal to restrict the constitutional provision for birthright citizenship in the case of the children of non-nationals. The proposed amendment, and a draft of the legislation to follow it, were then published in April.​[79]​ The amendment did not seek to alter Article 2 of the Constitution, but rather to add a new Article 9.2.1 to the Constitution:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of Ireland … who does not have, at the time of his or her birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless otherwise provided for by law.”

In addition, a new Article 9.2.2 was proposed, according to which “this section shall not apply to persons born before the date on which this section was enacted.” 

The Government’s case for the proposed reform was strongly contested in key respects. One argument advanced by the Government was that problems were being posed by non-nationals giving birth at Dublin maternity hospitals. As the Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, put it soon after the referendum was announced: 

“Our maternity services come under pressure because they have to deal at short notice with women who may have communications difficulties, about whom no previous history of the pregnancy or of the mother’s health is known, and who in about half of cases of first arrival … are already at or near labour. Hospitals cannot predict the demand on resources from month to month, and all the resources in the world would be of little use in dealing with suddenly-presenting crisis pregnancies.”​[80]​ 

This line of argument was however called into question by the Government’s failure to produce detailed information concerning births to non-resident mothers. The information which was provided during the referendum campaign concerned only some hospitals, and counted all non-nationals together.​[81]​ More detailed information published soon after the referendum did show that roughly one-sixth of births in Dublin in 2002 and 2003 were to non-EU nationals.​[82]​ Even then, however, there was no indication of the percentage of births to mother who were not resident in the State. 

A second Government argument concerned the Chen opinion.​[83]​ The Government argued that, if the opinion were to be followed, and Irish law were to remain unaltered, there would be an increase in the numbers of persons coming to Ireland to obtain citizenship for their children, which would in turn cause difficulties in Ireland’s relations with other member states. But that met the replies that the scope of the principle in the Chen opinion was likely to be limited (see above)​[84]​ and that EU law anyway gives member states freedom to determine their own nationality law.​[85]​ 

The Government also had difficulty explaining why its proposals were not inconsistent with the Belfast Agreement. On 19 April 2004, the Irish and British Governments published an ‘interpretative declaration’ on the British-Irish Agreement. In the declaration, the Governments offered the “legal interpretation” that

 “it was not their intention in making the said Agreement that it should impose on either Government any obligation to confer nationality or citizenship on persons born on the island of Ireland whose parents do not have sufficient connection with the island of Ireland.” 

It is doubtful however that the 2004 declaration does justice to the agreement reached in 1998. The statement that those lacking a ‘sufficient connection’ need not be granted nationality essentially sought to extend the 1998 declaration with respect to the “people of Northern Ireland” to the whole island. But, if that was what was intended in 1998, why was such a declaration not made at that time? There is anyway evidence that the effect of the new Article 2, in entrenching unconditional ius soli, was understood at the time by the negotiators on the Belfast Agreement. In a letter in April 1998 to the then leader of the Irish Labour Party, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in both 1998 and 2004 wrote that “One effect of the new Article will undoubtedly be to confer an entitlement to Irish citizenship on persons born in Northern Ireland irrespective of their family background or the circumstances of their birth in Northern Ireland.”​[86]​

Probably the most persuasive case made by the Government was the most fundamental one, that the referendum sought to preserve the ‘integrity’ of Irish citizenship. As the Tánaiste (deputy Prime Minister) argued, it was not the number of persons coming to Ireland which mattered, but the fact that the “our constitutional provisions are being used in a way we did not intend.”​[87]​ This view was encapsulated in the ‘common sense citizenship’ slogan of the campaign by the major governing party, Fianna Fáil. To quote the Minister for Children: “The referendum is about how in the light of the real-life circumstances in which we found ourselves, we shall regulate Irish citizenship for the future.”​[88]​ 

A number of compelling replies were offered to the ‘integrity’ argument in the referendum campaign. It was widely argued that a fundamental reform of nationality law should not occur without a thorough process of consultation and debate on the whole subject.​[89]​ It was said too that the requirement of a connection with Ireland was not being pursued systematically, given the possibility of acquiring citizenship through descent for a minimum of two generations,​[90]​ and given the lack of any proposal that an Irish-born child should be able to obtain citizenship though their own residence in Ireland.​[91]​ It was also argued that birthright citizenship should not be removed while immigration law made inadequate provision for rights of residence.​[92]​ Nevertheless, it was rare in the referendum campaign for a case to be made for unconditional ius soli as such, viewed in isolation from other considerations.​[93]​ 






The next stage in the controversy over birthright citizenship in Ireland will concern legislation to amend nationality law. As was mentioned above, the Government published draft legislation with the referendum proposal in April 2004, and the draft Bill is the subject of consultation at the time of writing. The Bill provides that a child born on the island of Ireland will acquire Irish citizenship in six circumstances, as follows. 

The first case is where at least one parent is an Irish citizen or “entitled to be” one. The notion of being ‘entitled’ to Irish citizenship is not explained in the proposals, or in existing legislation. The category presumably includes a parents born on the island of Ireland who is also entitled to another nationality, who must – after the 2001 Act - exercise their entitlement to citizenship by birth, but who has not done so at the time of the birth. The notion of ‘entitled’ also arguably includes the rarer case of a parent born outside the island of Ireland, who is entitled to citizenship by descent only if they register, but who has not registered at the time of the birth. It appears that the latter group will confer citizenship by birth on their children born on the island of Ireland, even though they cannot confer citizenship by descent upon them. 

Secondly, citizenship by birth will arise where at least one parent is a British citizen. The draft Bill provides that the children of British citizens will in all circumstances be entitled to Irish citizenship by birth, whichever part of the island of Ireland the children are born in. As regards births in the Irish state, this favouring of British citizens over other non-nationals is consistent with their general exemption from Irish immigration law.​[96]​ As regards births in Northern Ireland, meanwhile, it is consistent with the Northern Irish ‘birthright’ set out in the Belfast Agreement. 

Thirdly, a child will be eligible for Irish citizenship where at the time of the birth at least one parent is “entitled to reside in the State without any restriction on [their] period of residence.” There is a basic difficulty with this clause: because of the inadequate development of Irish immigration law, there is at present no general concept of permanent residence which can be relied upon for this purpose. As long as such a concept is not introduced, the citizenship of the child will be dependent upon the terms of the immigration permissions given to individuals by the Minister for Justice.​[97]​ 

The fourth case will be that of a parent who is “entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on [their] period of residence.” Since there is no separate immigration law for Northern Ireland, the notion of being “entitled to reside in Northern Ireland” is inherently problematic. It seems that anyone who is permanently resident in the United Kingdom will be able to confer Irish citizenship by birth on their child, even if they have never resided in - or indeed been to - Northern Ireland. This was made clear in the April 2004 memorandum which accompanied the draft legislation, according to which this criterion would be satisfied by a parents with “an entitlement to reside in the UK (and thus in Northern Ireland)”.​[98]​ 

A fifth possibility will be that at least one parent has been resident in the island of Ireland for at least three years out of the previous four.​[99]​ A period of residence will not count for these purposes if it arises under a permission to study, during a period of application for asylum, or is unlawful. One set of problems with the requirement of parental residence are again posed by the inclusion of Northern Ireland. It is inherently difficult to measure a parent’s length of residence in Northern Ireland, given that it is not distinct from the rest of Britain for immigration purposes. It is also peculiar that Irish citizenship will depend on the immigration status of the parent in British law, which may differ in material respects from that in Irish law. A second set of difficulties with the requirement of parental residence concerns EEA and Swiss parents, since they frequently do not register their residence in Britain and Ireland. The draft legislation attempts to deal with the problems of proof which will arise by allowing a parent who is a national of an EEA state, or of the Swiss confederation, to make a ‘statutory declaration’ as to their length of residence on the island of Ireland. A declaration may also be made by the guardian or person in loco parentis to the child of a citizen of such a state, or by the child themselves after the age of 18. In each case, the declaration has presumptive force only.

The sixth case will be that of statelessness. It is not proposed in the draft legislation to alter the existing rule whereby “a person born in the island of Ireland is an Irish citizen from birth if [they are] not entitled to citizenship of any other country.”​[100]​ The peculiar effect of this rule in relation to Northern Ireland may be noted, however. Where a child is born in Northern Ireland, and is not ordinarily entitled to any nationality, then it appears that the child obtains Irish citizenship, and does not become a British national. This is because British law does not confer nationality automatically in cases of statelessness, but instead allows an individual to register as a British national, if they were born in Britain, have spent most of the previous five years there, and have been stateless throughout their lives.​[101]​ 

It can be seen that, as always when citizenship by birth is dependent on parental status, difficult issues of definition and implementation arise in the draft legislation. These difficulties are unusually complex in the Irish case, however, because of the desire that residence in Northern Ireland should count, even though Northern Ireland is not separate from the rest of Britain for immigration purposes. It cannot therefore be ruled out the details of the rules on parental nationality and residence will have to be revisited, either in the current legislative process, or subsequently.
 

Conclusion: citizenship and change in Ireland

The principle of unconditional ius soli has been central to Irish nationality law for most of the period since the Irish state came into being. It has been applied to births in the Irish state from 1935, and to births in Northern Ireland ever since 1956. It also attained the rare status of having been constitutionally entrenched as a consequence of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. In historical terms, the centrality of ius soli to Irish nationality law can be seen as a reflection of a combination of British influence and of a territorial conception of the Irish people. 

	While the probable abandonment of unconditional ius soli is a significant development in Ireland, it is not unusual when viewed in comparative terms. In states where significant immigration occurs, that frequently exerts an influence on the content of nationality law.​[102]​ States where it is possible to acquire citizenship through birth, whether unconditionally, or with restrictions, often respond by introducing restrictions. Equally, immigration in states where nationality law is based on ius sanguinis often liberalise the law on naturalisation and ius soli, in order to avoid a substantial population of permanent non-national residents. While there are reasons for scepticism about the constitutional amendment, the likely curtailment of ius soli is consistent with a wider international pattern. 

	Nor is the rise in immigration is not the only change in Irish society which has been expressed in recent changes to its nationality law. The attenuation of the historical claims to the people and territory of the whole island is also part of the background to recent developments. The move away from that approach to Irishness had already been seen in the Belfast Agreement: the ‘birthright’ clauses treated Irish citizenship as an entitlement rather than as automatic, while the new Article 2 deliberately substituted a personal entitlement for the previous territorial claim. That tendency has now been confirmed by the 2004 referendum and the expected legislation: the denial of an entitlement to Irish citizenship to some persons born on the island is a further departure from a territorial definition of the Irish people. 
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